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It is often argued that monetary instability reduces the informational content of market
signals and thereby hinders the efficient allocation of investment. Essay I, uses a signal
extraction framework to give empirical content to this idea. In particular, we show why
this framework predicts that, as monetary uncertainty decreases, the cross-sectional
distribution of investment widens. We then explore this hypothesis using panel data
information for UK companies over twenty years and receive support from the data.
Essay II. investigates whether the Istanbul Bourse is efficient or not. To carry out the
investigation, the paper applies Johansen's cointegration technique to twelve asset prices
from the Istanbul Bourse along with the exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and the
Turkish Lira. The results of these tests suggest that investors in the Istanbul Bourse do not
seem to consistently reap abnormal profits by being able to predict future prices. Although
asset prices seem to move together in the long run, the use of ECM fails to improve
forecasts over univariate martingale predictions.
Although the existence of international trade in similar products has captured the attention
of trade theorists over the last two decades, it has not been incorporated into models of
investment. Essay III develops a Tobin's Q model of capital investment with a purpose to
explain the investment decision rule of a firm operating in both domestic and foreign output
markets in competition with a foreign rival. Empirical results provide support for the
model's predictions.
ESSAY I
MONETARY INSTABILITY, THE PREDICTABILITY OF PRICES AND THE
ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT: An Empirical Investigation Using
UK Panel Data
1. Introduction
A major goal of macroeconomic policy throughout industrialized countries is to achieve low
and stable inflation. There are many reasons advanced in defense of this goal. One reason often
given is that lowering and stabilizing inflation improves the informational content of the price
system and thereby favors a more efficient allocation of resources. 1 In this view, price stability
allows investments to be more effectively channeled towards projects with the highest returns since
the best opportunities are more easily identified. Although such a belief is widely shared, to our
knowledge it has not been subject to close empirical scrutiny.
In this paper, we propose a framework aimed at giving empirical content to the idea that
monetary instability adversely affects the allocation of investment. To this end, we develop a
simple macro model to illustrate the impact of monetary instability on the allocation of investment.
In particular, we show that as monetary policy becomes more predictable and, as a consequence,
individual relative prices become easier to forecast, the cross-sectional distribution of investment
1See, for instance, Friedman (1977).
should widen. The reason is that better quality information should lead to a more unequal
distribution of investment across firms as the market takes advantage of more precise knowledge
of different investment opportunities. When firm sPecific differences in profit opportunities are,
instead, hard to predict, we should observe less cross-sectional variations in investment rates.
Therefore, our framework predicts a negative association between the cross-sectional variance of
investment and nominal (aggregate demand) uncertainty. In accordance with this observation, our
empirical strategy consists of examining whether different measures of nominal uncertainty help in
explaining the time-variation in the cross-sectional distribution of investment. Clearly, monetary
policy is not the only source of uncertainty in the economy and, for this reason, our model should
be taken as a stylized account of the way in which general macroeconomic instability may affect the
allocation of investment.
Our empirical work exploits a panel data set covering a large number of quoted UK
companies over the period 1970-1990. We first document that there were substantial variations in
the cross-sectional distribution of investment over this period. More specifically, the distribution
of investment rates narrowed significantly during the 1970's and then widened anew in the 1980's.
Moreover, the dispersion displays procyclical movements, in the sense that the distribution
narrows during recessions and widens during booms. The macroeconomic history of the UK,
characterized by greater turbulence in the 1970's with frequent changes in monetary policy induced
by adverse supply shocks, followed by a greater stability in the 1980's, provides some prima facie
evidence in favor of our story. We supplement this informal evidence with two formal tests. The
first test investigates the association between the cross-sectional variance of investment and macro
measures of nominal uncertainty. These measures are based on estimates of the conditional
variances of money and inflation derived from ARCH models. The second test is based entirely on
panel data and uses the model's prediction that there should be a negative association between the
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cross-sectional variance of investment and the cross-sectional variance of the log of the profit rate.
The reason for this negative association is quite intuitive. By reducing the information content of
prices, monetary instability reduces the capacity of investment flows to equate profit rates across
fmns. Therefore, a lower cross-sectional variance in investment should be associated with a
higher cross-sectional variance of profit rates. This second test of the model is perhaps the more
attractive of the two since it more easily differentiate our story from plausible alternatives.
The overall evidence is supportive of the framework we propose to explain the relationship
between nominal uncertainty, the informational content of prices, and the time variations in the
cross-sectional distribution of investment. Hence, we conclude that the data is consistent with the
view that monetary instability may affect the process of investment allocation through its effect on
the predictability of prices. The theoretical and empirical emphasis on the effect of the
informational content of market signals on the distribution of investment is the distinguishing and
unique feature of our paper. However, its general objective is related to that of numerous
contributions that have studied the effects of inflation on relative price volatility and on the
optimality of resource allocation.2 Although we do not provide an analysis of the welfare
consequences of uncertainty in this paPer, it is clear that the link we outline between nominal
uncertainty and the allocation of investment may be one of the important elements in such an
analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we extend a Lucas
(1973) model to show how variations in the predictability of monetary policy can lead to changes
in the distribution of investment. Section 3 documents the nature of the time variation in the cross-
2The emphasis on the ability to predict future prices on the basis of current information (in particular price
information) is also the distinguishing feature of the recent theoretical contributions by Ball and Romer (1993) and
Tommasi (1994a).
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sectional distribution of investment in our data. Section 4 discusses how this observed time-
variation accords with the macro evidence on inflation and money growth uncertainty, while
Section 5 presents micro evidence on the link between the cross-sectional variance of profits and of
investment. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
In this section we develop a simple model to illustrate how macroeconomic uncertainty can
affect the allocation of investment through its effect on the informational content of prices. In the
model, we focus on variations in the predictability of monetary policy as a source of changes in the
informational content of market signals. The environment we consider modifies the island model
used by Lucas (1973) in a manner that emphasizes the implications for investment as opposed to
employment. Firms in the model are assumed to operate in competitive markets that are subject to
both relative demand and aggregate monetary shocks. Investment in physical capital is assumed to
have a one period delivery lag and, therefore, investment decisions must be based on firms'
expectations of the relative prices to prevail next Period. In order to form such expectations, firms
have access to all observations on prices in their own market as well as past information in all other
markets. They use this information to extract signals about the future demand. However, because
of the time variation in the predictability of monetary policy, the informational content of these
market signals may vary over time. The question we want to address is what are the observable
implications for investment of changes in the time variation of the informational content of prices.
Consider an economy where there is a continuum of markets indexed by z, and z is
uniformly distributed over the unit interval. The demand for goods in market z dePends both on
relative prices and on the state of aggregate demand. For simplicity, the logarithm of the demand
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for goods produced in market z is given by equation (1), and aggregate demand is assumed to
satisfy the quantity theory as in (2):
y:(z) =yf - Y(Pt(z) - pt ) + et(z),
DYt =mt - PI'
where:
yt(z): log of real demand in market z,
Dyt : log of real aggregate demand,
Pt(z): log of price in market z,
1
Pt: price index defined by JPt (z)dz ,
o
r: price elasticity of demand,
et ( z): exogenous relative demand component,
mt : log of the money supply.
(1)
(2)
Equations (1) and (2) together reflect the fact that demand can be perturbed by both real demand
factors through et ( z), and nominal factors through mt. However, because the origin of a shock
is not readily identifiable, firms need to solve a signal extraction problem in order to predict real
factors affecting the future demand. The exact nature of this signal extraction problem will become
clear shortly.
The supply of output in the economy is determined by representative firms, one of which
exists in each market. The production of output is assumed to dePend only on capital. Therefore,
at any given point in time, the supply of output in market z can be represented by (3) where the
(log) capital stock in each market, kt ( z), is determined one Period ahead:
5
(3)
Because of a one period delivery lag, the representative firm in market z determines the next
period's capital stock by setting the expected marginal product of capital for next period equal to
the user cost of capital, which we denote by Ct. When making such an investment decision, the
firm does not know next period's marginal revenue product of capital since it does not know the
real price that will prevail. However, the firm can form an expectation of the real price of good z
based on its observation of the current price of the good and all past information on the economy
(which we denote by [2t-1). Notice that this informational structure implies, as in Lucas (1973),
that aggregate information is revealed to the firm with a one period lag. Therefore, assuming
prices are log-normally distributed (which in equilibrium will be valid), the determination of period
t+1 capital stock in each market is given by equation (4):
where:
1 2
Varz,t(pt+I (z) - Pt+l) = J{(Pt+I (z) - Pt+I) - E[(Pt+l (z) - pt+I)IPt(z),Qt-d} dz.
o
Equation (4) states that the (log) capital stock in a market increases with the expected real
(log) price of the good and decreases with the (log) user cost of capital. It also indicates that the
(log) capital stock increases with the conditional variance of the real price of good z. This last
effect reflects Jensen's inequality and can essentially be disregarded in our discussion since in
equilibrium this conditional variance is constant. Moreover, in all that follows, we assume that the
6
user cost of capital, ct ' is constant over time.3 Hence, the only effective source of time variation
in market-specific capital is due to changes in the expected real prices of goods.
The nature of the informational problem faced by firms is now made clear by equation (4).
In particular, a firm would like to know the current state of relative demand in its market in order to
forecast the future level of relative demand and in order to most appropriately determine
investment. However, fmns do not have this information. Instead, each firm must extract, from
both its current observation on its market-specific price and its knowledge of the past state of the
economy, a prediction of the future relative price of its goods. The conditional eXPectation in
equation (4) precisely reflects this information processing problem. However, solving this
conditional expectation problem is complicated by general equilibrium interactions.
In order to solve for an equilibrium, we need to SPecify the properties of the two driving
forces. First, let the exogenous money supply process be represented by the (possibly-non
stationary) autoregressive and heteroscedastic process given in (5):
(5)
In equation (5), the monetary innovation f..lt is an independent and normally distributed
random variable with mean zero and conditional variance r;, and A(L) is a polynomial in the lag
operator. The important element to notice in (5) is that the money supply process is characterized
by time-variation in its predictability since the variance of f..lt is not constant. In fact, it is precisely
the implications of such "monetary instability" that we are trying to explore--that is, the
implications for investment of variations in r;. Obviously, we are not claiming here that only
variations in uncertainty associated with monetary policy are important. This model should be
3This could be formally justified by the explicit inclusion of risk neutral agents in the economy.
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taken as a stylized account of the consequences for the distribution of investment of an increase in
macroeconomic policy uncertainty in general.
The other driving forces in this economy are the relative demand components. These
exogenous forces are assumed to be stationary (in order for real prices to be stationary) and are
assumed to obey the first-order autoregressive process given by (6):
(6)
In (6), the innovation in relative demand, vlz), is assumed to be independently and
1
normally distributed with mean zero, constant conditional variance, (72, and with Jv t ( z)dz = O.
o
Assuming that all markets are Walrasian, an equilibrium for this economy is characterized
by a pair of market-specific stochastic processes for capital and prices, such that: (a) given the
allocation of capital, prices ensure the equality of supply and demand in each market; and (b) given
prices, the allocation of capital satisfies equation (4).
Using the method of undetermined coefficients, it is straightforward (but somewhat
tedious) to show that the following pair of stochastic processes for capital and the aggregate price
level constitute an equilibrium:4
(7)
4Notice that constants have been omitted from both equations for simplicity. In order to verify that these equations
constitute an equilibrium behavior; first, postulate that capital expenditure decisions are of the form specified in
equation (7); second, use this conjecture to derive the behavior of prices that would equate supply and demand and
note that it corresponds to equation (8); third, use the resulting price behavior in conjunction with equation (4) to
derive optimal capital expenditure decisions (which requires the solution to be a signal extraction problem); finally,
verify that the resulting capital expenditure decisions are equal to those initially postulated.
8
(8)
where cfJ1 =_---'-P__() + (1- e)y
pa2
and cfJ2 t = 2 2 2 2 •
, (a + "t Y )Y(1- ()) + ()a
There are several features of the capital stock equation to which we want to attract attention.
First, equation (7) states that capital stocks depend both on real factors, affecting relative demand,
and on monetary innovations. Monetary innovations affect the capital stocks because of the
confusion between real and nominal factors as in Lucas (1972 and 1973). A positive monetary
innovation increases investment because it leads the firm to infer from an increase in nominal
demand that relative demand has increased (since the firm is solving a signal extraction problem).
This leads to higher expected future relative demand. The second element to note from equation
(7) is that the sensitivity of capital expenditures to monetary innovations depends on the stability of
monetary policy. In particular, an increase in monetary instability, as represented by an increase in
,,;, leads to a fall in cfJ2,t. This change in cfJ2,t reflects the fact that when monetary policy is less
predictable, firms interpret observed increases in demand as reflecting mainly monetary factors (as
opposed to real factors). A final aspect to note from (7) is that an increase in monetary instability
also leads firms to adjust less to innovations in relative demand. Hence, when monetary policy is
more unstable, productive capacity will be less effectively targeted towards the sectors with high
demand. We find that this latter feature of the model nicely captures the notion that monetary
instability may reduce the efficient allocation of investment by reducing the informational content of
prices.
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In order to render the above observations empirically testable, it is helpful to examine the
implication of equation (7) for the variance of the cross-sectional distribution of the investment
rate. Using the fact that the investment rate can be approximated as the log difference of the capital
stock, equation (7) implies that the cross-sectional distribution of investment rate can be written as:
(9)
From equation (9), it can be seen that cross-sectional distribution of the rates of investment
is related to both the variance of v t ( z) and the variance of f.Lt (through <P2,t). Note that for our
purpose, it is the effects of the time-variation in the variance of f.Lt which is of interest since it is
this variance that reflects the effects of monetary instability. In fact, equation (9) implies that the
cross-sectional variance of the investment rate depends upon the contemporaneous and once lagged
variance of monetary innovations with the following partial derivatives:
(10)
(11)
. As stated in (10) and (11), an increase in r; leads to a decrease in the variance of the
investment rate, while the effect of r;-l is ambiguous. (Note that as long as p is not too large, the
effect of rLl will also be negative.) Therefore, the main insight we draw from (8) is that, when
monetary policy becomes more stable and the predictability of prices improves, cross-sectional
distribution of the rates of investment widens. This arises because investment is distributed more
unevenly across firms as each of them responds more accurately to differences in the profitability
of investment. Conversely, when prices become harder to predict, the cross-sectional distribution
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of investment rates will contemporaneously tend to narrow. In order to make this prediction easily
implementable empirically, it is useful to consider the linear approximation of equation (8) as given
below:
(12)
with f32 < o.
Equation (9), which forms the basis of part of our empirical investigation, states that
holding (12 and 'fL1 constant, an increase in 'f; should be associated with a reduction in the
cross-sectional variance of the investment rate.
The model we have develoPed provides one interpretation of how a change in the
informational content of market signals can effect the variance of the investment rate over time.
Obviously, other rationales may exist. Potential candidates include explanations based on risk
aversion, asymmetric information, and costly contract enforcement problems.5 However, we
believe that the above model manages to capture an uncertainty-based explanation in a very simple
manner, and therefore, we think it is appropriate to adopt it as a base from which to empirically
investigate changes in the variance of investment. Moreover, this model provides a clear example
5 For instance it may be argued that in bad times lenders find high debt to asset ratios less acceptable because they
are perceived as being associated with greater risks of bankruptcy. If this leads to higher interest rates or rationing
for firms characterized by high leverage, we could observe, for each level of internal funds, a decrease both in the
mean value of the investment rate and a compression from the top of the distribution in bad times. In a sense this
argument is related with the "flight to quality" story that emphasizes how credit may concentrate on the safer firms
in bad times (see Bernanke, Blinder and Gilchrist (1994)). Nevertheless, existing models do not address the
distributional issue directly and the arguments presented above is highly speculative at this stage. It goes beyond the
purpose of this paper to produce a model based on capital market imperfections, although this is certainly a fertile
topic for future research. We will therefore continue to focus on the role of uncertainty in the context of a perfect
capital market.
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of how macro uncertainty can hinder the efficient allocation of investment, and therefore growth,
independently of its effect on the average rate of investment.
3. Trend and Cyclical Distributional Changes of the Investment Rate
The model presented in Section 2 suggests analyzing the time-variation in the distribution
of investment as a means of examining the effects of time-variation in the predictability of prices.
This section begins by discussing the empirical evidence on the evolution of the cross-sectional
distribution of UK firms' investment rate over the period 1970-1990. The objective of this
exercise is to document both the trend and cyclical movements that occurred during the 1970's and
the 1980's. The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced sample of 963 quoted UK companies
for which complete and consistent balance sheet data are available for at least three consecutive
years. The source of the data is the DATASTREAM file. The replacement value of capital stock
has been calculated using the perpetual inventory formula.6
In order to provide a summary of the distributional changes that have occurred, we report
in Table 1 the standard deviation, the coefficient of variation, the 1st decile, the 1st quartile, the
median, the 3rd quartile and the 9th decile of the investment rate. Figure 1a contains plots of the
percentiles, while in Figure 1b we plot the inter-quartile (inter-decile) range to provide a better
picture of changes in the dispersion of the distribution.
Three main features are revealed. First, concentrating on trend movements, it is evident
that investment rates decreased during the 1970's. Second, the decrease was, however, greater for
the 9th decile and for the 3rd quartile, so that we detect a substantial narrowing from the top of the
distribution of investment rate over the 1970's. Both the 9th decile and the 3rd quartile dropped by
6See Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1992) for details about variables' construction.
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approximately 45% comparing the investment rate in 1970 with that of 1980. During the 1980's
we observe the opposite phenomenon with the dispersion of the distribution of the degree of
leverage gradually increasing starting from 1983 and, more dramatically, between 1986 and 1988.
This is because of a faster increase in the investment rate for the 9th decile, and also for the 3rd
quartile than that of the median up to 1988. Comparing 1981 with 1988, we observe that the 9th
decile and the third quartile increased, respectively, by 180% and 140%. Finally, at a cyclical
frequency, we observe a decrease in investment rates for firms in periods corresponding to most of
the recessionary episodes, leading to a decrease in dispersion. This is true for the recession of
1971, 1974-1975, 1980-1982 and the recession starting in 1990.
In order to make certain that these are genuine changes and do not only reflect the variation
in the composition of the sample, we partition the whole sample into two sub-periods: 1970-1980
and 1980-1990. For each sub-period, we present graphs on four samples that differ for the
conditions imposed on firms' entry and exit in the panel. In the first sample, we allow for both
entry and exit (fully unbalanced). In the second, we allow entry but not exit by choosing only the
firms that survived until the final year (1980 in one case and 1990 in the other). In the third
sample, we do not allow entry but we allow exit choosing only the firms that were in existence in
the initial year (1970 and 1980 respectively). Finally in the fourth sample, we allow neither entry
nor exit by considering firms with observations for all the years in each sub-sample (fully balanced
within each sub-period). This breakdown allows us to investigate whether and how the evolution
of the investment rate differs for different categories of firms (new entrants, exiting firms,
survivors). Table 2a gives the number of firms in each sample in each year, while Table 2b
provides the number of entering and exiting firms for the different samples. The plots of the
relevant percentiles in deviation from the median for each sub-period are given in Figures 2 a, b, c,
d and 3 a, b, c, d.
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For all four samples in the 1970's, we see a reduction of the dispersion of the distribution
because of the greater fall in the investment rate for the top decile (quartile). Perhaps it would not
be surprising to see such reduction of the dispersion in a sample which allows firms to exit, since
as the time passes surviving firms become more alike. However, we obtain the same results when
we do not allow for exit. Similarly, the widening of the distribution between 1987 and 1989 is
common to all four samples. However, the increase in dispersion from 1983 to 1988 is more
marked for the samples that allow for new entrants, compared to the samples in which entry is not
allowed. The decrease in dispersion starting in 1989 is also more pronounced. This says that new
entrants contribute in an important way to the changes in dispersion. From the point of view of
this paPer, however, the important thing is that our general qualitative conclusions about the
evolution of dispersion of the investment rate hold for all four sampling criteria.
4. Macroeconomic Evidence on the Effect of Uncertainty on the Variance of
Investment.
Our model predicts that a more unstable and uncertain macroeconomic environment,
because of its adverse effect on the informational content of prices, should lead to a cross-sectional
distribution of the investment rate characterized by less disPersion. The panel data evidence for the
UK suggest that there was an overall decrease in the dispersion in the 1970's and an increase in the
1980's. Dispersion also appears to have moved procylically, falling in recessions and rising in
during expansions. In order to assess whether our model can provide a satisfactory explanation of
these changes, we need to define appropriate measures of uncertainty and assess the nature of their
correlation with the variance of the investment rate. We will start from an anecdotal approach and
argue that the main macroeconomic developments in the UK during the Periods covered by our
panel are indeed consistent with the changes in the cross-sectional distribution of investment. The
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main theme we want to emphasize is that the 1970's were characterized by a high and increasing
degree of macro volatility while the 1980's saw a return to a more stable environment, particularly
with regard to the inflation rate. Clearly the two oil price shocks were very important in giving rise
to the initial upward pressure on prices in the 1970's. However, the increase in inflation is
intimately related to the macroeconomic policy response adopted by the government in its attempt
to keep unemployment from rising in the context of wage resistance by unions. We focus on this
policy response and, in particular, on the consequences of an increase in the uncertainty that
characterizes such response in the wake of the adverse supply shocks. In order to test our model
more formally, we complement the descriptive evidence on macroeconomic developments in the
UK with the econometric results obtained from estimating ARCH models for prices and money,
and analyze the direction, strength and significance of the association between the conditional
variances of inflation and money with the variance of the investment rate. Finally, in the next
section we develop a test of our model using a panel data based measure of uncertainty. Although
we regard the latter test as the most convincing and innovative one, we find the macro evidence
informative as well.
4.1 Anecdotal Evidence
The decade of the 1970's was characterized by the rise in international commodities prices
that generated periods of crisis in which all GECD economies suffered from high inflation, balance
of payment problems, an increase in unemployment, and a general slow down of growth. The UK
was one of the countries for which the adjustment to the adverse supply shock was particularly
difficult. The annual rate of inflation in the UK was in the double digits for most of the 1970's and
exceeded 20% for 1974 and 1975. Moreover, the inflation rate in the 1970's was not only higher
on average than in the 1980's but also more variable. Neither the policies of the Conservative
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governments, between 1970-1974, nor the Labour governments, between 1974-1979, were
successful in controlling inflation, although different strategies were attempted, including statutory
and voluntary incomes policies during some of the periods.? Over this period there were frequent
changes of economic policy strategies by both sets of administrations, which may have contributed
to uncertainty about the evolution of prices and other macro aggregates. The overall lack of
permanent success in the struggle to control inflation was due in part to the real wage resistance
exhibited by the unions, to which incomes policy brought only temporary relief. It also reflected
the post war political consensus in the attempt by the governments to maintain high levels of
employment. This commitment, shared, for the most part, by all political parties, gave both fiscal
and monetary policy a stop-and-go quality as the governments tried to navigate among slow-downs
in economic activity with the attending unemployment problem, the occurrence of balance of
payment crises, and the resurgence of inflation. We have already commented about inflation. The
two main contractionary episodes followed the oil price shocks at the end of 1973 and in 1979 and
the contemporaneous slow-down of world trade. There was also a significant contraction in 1971.
The victory by the Conservative party in the 1979 elections changed the rules of the game
in terms of economic policy. Following the collapse of the previous Labour government income
policy during the winter of discontent of 1978-1979, the new Conservative government led by
Mrs. Thatcher pursued a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, that in addition to the effect of the
oil price increase and the slow-down in world demand, created a very severe contraction that lasted
until 1982. It has been debated how restrictive monetary policy actually was during that Period,
since the growth rate of M3 often overshot the target ranges set by the government. However, the
behavior of narrower money aggregates, like MO, and the appreciation of the pound sterling
7See Caimcross (1992) for a detailed overview of the macro developments and of the policy responses.
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suggests that monetary policy was indeed tight. Moreover, the fiscal policy stance was also
contractionary, and indeed the control of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement was the main
instrument through which the government attempted to reduce the rate of growth of money.8
Whatever the final judgment on how the initial contraction was achieved and on possible initial
mistakes,9 it is clear that the government eventually succeeded in establishing its credibility in the
anti-inflation strategy, whatever the cost in terms of unemployment was. The willingness to live
with high levels of unemployment was a departure from the post-war consensus and, together with
legislation aimed at decreasing the power of the unions, succeeded in achieving low and steady
inflation rates. By 1982 the rate of inflation was down to 5.4%, and reached its lowest value (3%)
in 1986. The years between 1982 and 1989 were a period of steady expansion in output. I0 The
evolution of the money growth rate suggests that monetary policy was not particularly
expansionary for most of the 1980's. Finally, the period of expansion cause to a close at the end
of the 1980's and was followed by the beginning of another severe (and long) recession, starting
in 1990, that was reflected in a negative growth rate of GDP for manufacturing in that year. The
change in the volatility and predictability of the economic environment that occurred over the
1970's and 1980's, as suggested by our brief summary of the macroeconomic developments in the
UK, fits together nicely with the observed variations in the dispersion of the investment rate if one
is ready to associate the overall turbulence with (nominal) monetary instability.
8See Buiter and Miller (1981) and (1983) for a detailed description and evaluation of Mrs. Thatcher's policies.
9The inflationary increase in VAT and the initial wage increases accorded to public sector employees have been
mentioned in this respect.
IOProductivity also increased, though the unemployment performance of the UK was rather disappointing in absolute
terms and relative to other OEeD countries. See Bean and Symons (1989), and Matthews and Minford (1987) for an
evaluation of the Thatcher years.
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4.2 Arch Results
The anecdotal approach provides some prima facie evidence that is consistent with the
predictions of our simple model. However, in order to provide a more formal test, we need to
derive quantitative measures of the degree of nominal uncertainty. For this reason, we have
estimated ARCH models for inflation and money supply growth. I I ARCH models allow for the
conditional variance of an economic time series to change over time and are appropriate to model its
behavior when the series displays periods of high volatility followed by periods of tranquillity.
The conditional variance is the variance of the forecast error conditioned on the available
information set and provides us a measure of the precision with which forecasts can be made. In
our empirical application, we have used monthly data over the period 1960 to 1990 for the log
difference of the CPI and quarterly data for M4. I2 The choice of a meaningful monetary aggregate
covering a two decades period is fraught with conceptual and data difficulties. Since money
supply in the model is the only determinant of aggregate demand, we have used quarterly M4
which is the only wide money aggregate continuously available over the entire period. I 3 For both
series we first test for the presence of ARCH effects using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. We
then estimate an ARCH model by maximum likelihood (ML), with linearly declining weights for
the conditional variance for each of the two variables. Use of linearly declining weights makes it
easier to ensure that the conditional variance is always positive. The estimated model is:
p
Yt =Lf3iYt-i + Ct'
i=1
(13)
IISee Engle (1982).
I2The data for M4 is seasonally adjusted. Since that the CPI data is not seasonally adjusted, we include seasonal
dummies in estimating the inflation equation.
I3Monthly M4 is only available from August 1982, while the only other continuously available series, MO, is
more weakly linked to aggregate demand.
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where Yt denotes either the CPI or the index of manufacturing production and Ct = J.1t-fh;. J.1t is a
zero mean, unit variance white noise process and ht is defined as:
q 2
ht =ao + a 1LaiCt-i"
i=1
(14)
where ai =(q +1- iI~ i. Mter some experimentation and testing we have set p =6 and q =8
for the inflation rate, while for the logarithmic growth rate ofM4 we have set p=4 and q=1.14 The
results of the LM tests are reported in Part A of Table 3, with the ML estimates in Part B. The LM
tests suggest that the hypothesis of constant conditional variance can be rejected at the 1%
significance level. a1 is significantly different from zero in a one-sided test at the 1% level in the
inflation equation and at the 5% level in the money growth equation. The estimated conditional
variances for inflation and for money growth rate suggest that the 1970s were turbulent years
compared to the 1980s (see figures 4a and 4b).15 These results confirm and complement those
obtained for UK inflation by Engle (1982) who finds significant ARCH effects during the 1960's
and 1970's.16
The consistency of macroeconomic developments with the prediction of our theoretical
model can now be investigated formally by analyzing the direction and significance of the
association between the estimate of the conditional variances obtained from the ARCH model with
the estimate of the variance of the investment rate obtained from the panel. Such a test is based on
14 In both cases ao is positive and a1 is between zero and one, guaranteeing positive variance for any value of e1·
15We also estimated ARCH models with longer lags on p and q for both models. The chosen specifications cannot be
rejected against the more general models on the basis of likelihood ratio tests.
160n a related topic, see also Ball and Cecchetti (1990) who provide evidence that high levels of inflation are
accompanied by greater uncertainty about future inflation, especially at long horizons. Moreover, Tommasi (l994b)
finds that higher inflation is associated with greater difficulties in predicting relative prices.
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the linearized version of equation (9) (see (12)).1 7 Since the ARCH model for inflation is
estimated using monthly data, we have taken twelve-month averages of the estimated conditional
variances. Similarly, we have taken four-quarter averages of the estimated conditional variances
for money growth. In Table 4a we present the results of the OLS regression of the investment
variance on the contemporaneous and once lagged estimated conditional variance of inflation,
denoted by CVCPlt and CVCPlt_ 1 respectively.18 In this and the following regressions, we
have allowed for an intercept shift between the 1970's and 1980's. This is meant to capture any
decade long shifts in the variance (j2. The important result to note for our purposes is that both
the coefficients on CVCPlt and CVCPlt_ 1 are negative and are jointly significantly different from
zero, with a marginal significance level of less than 1% (F2,15= 7.85).19 Although the theory
presented in section 2 has a definite prediction only for the coefficient associated with CVCPlt_ b
the estimates presented in Table 4 suggest that lagged nominal uncertainty also has a negative
effect. To gain some intuition about the magnitude of the effects, consider that these results imply
that, starting from their mean values, a 50% increase in the (conditional) standard deviation of the
inflation rate generates approximately a cumulative 20% increase in the standard deviation of the
investment rate after three periods. In Table 4b, we report the results obtained when the
conditional variance of M4 (denoted by CVM4t ) is used as our measure of nominal uncertainty.
The sign of the coefficients are consistent with the prediction of our model (both of them are
17Huizinga (1993) presents interesting empirical evidence for the US on the relationship between inflation and real
price uncertainty, and on their effect on the level of investment. The emphasis in our paper is, instead, on the effect
of uncertainty on the cross-sectional variance of investment.
181n calculating the variance of the investment rates we have used only firms with at least seven years of
observation. This leaves us with 721 firms. We have made this choice in order to strike a balance between
maintaining a large number of firms in the calculation, while avoiding the drawbacks deriving from changes in the
composition of the sample in each year. However, the basic results hold for different choices of the firms included
in the calculation of the variance.
19Although the conditional variance of inflation is a generated regressor, as shown in Pagan (1984) the joint test of
significance is perfectly valid (while the individual t statistics are not).
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negative), but their significance is not as sharp as for the proxy of uncertainty derived from the
inflation equation (F2,15 = 2.75). However, the magnitude of the effect is similar. In this case a
50% increase in the (conditional) standard deviation of the money growth rate leads,
approximately, to a 25% increase in the standard deviation of the investment rate after three
periods. This may be the result of the very stylized nature of the model (that relies, for instance,
on a stable velocity of money) and the difficulty in identifying a single monetary aggregate bearing
a stable relationship with aggregate demand over a two decades period.
Before exploring the evidence on time-variation in price predictability based on micro data,
it is relevant to ask whether the results reported to date could alternatively be interpreted as
reflecting time-variation in fundamental uncertainty (as captured by (5;) as opposed to variation in
noise (as captured by r;). As can be inferred from equation (8), the contemporaneous effect of an
increase in (5; on the variance of the investment rate (holding r; constant) is positive, since it is
efficient to distribute investment more unevenly when there is more divergence in profitable
opportunities. Therefore, to explain the narrowing of the distribution of investment rates observed
in the late 1970s and early 1980s by changes in the variance of fundamental shocks, it would be
necessary to argue that this period was a period of relative tranquillity. This explanation seems
implausible to us.
The previous discussion is relevant also in understanding whether adverse supply shocks
may explain the observed movements in the cross-sectional variance of investment. Supply shocks
can be modeled by inserting a firm and time specific additive stochastic term in the (logarithmic)
production function summarized by equation (3). Different values of the shock across firms may
reflect differences in energy needs. The 1974 and 1979 oil price shocks could be interpreted as
lowering the mean of this term and increasing its variance. However, it can be easily shown that in
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the absence of a signal extraction problem, an increase in such variance would lead to an increase
in the variance of the investment rate. The effect of a supply shock is therefore similar to the one
caused by an increase in the variance of the real demand shocks, a 2, and it leads to the
counterfactual implication that an oil price shock should increase the cross-sectional variance of
investment.
5. Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Uncertainty.
We now adopt a different and novel approach to test our model. In the previous sections,
we focused on the pattern of co-movement between the cross-sectional distribution of investment
and aggregate measures of nominal uncertainty. In contrast, in this section we want to examine the
relationship between the cross-sectional variance of the profit rate and the cross-sectional variance
of the investment rate implied by our model. An advantage of this change of focus is that it allows
us to develop a test that exclusively uses information drawn from our panel data set. Moreover,
this alternative focus is methodologically attractive since it provides an example in which panel data
is used to test a model's prediction regarding the co-movement of second moments.
The intuition behind our alternative test is quite simple. In the case of increased nominal
uncertainty, we showed in Section 2 that investments will be less efficiently channeled towards the
most profitable investment opportunities. Correspondingly, increased nominal uncertainty should
lead to an increased dispersion of the ex post profit rates since investment flows are de facto less
likely to equalize profit rates. Hence, these two observations imply that an increase in the cross-
sectional variance of the ex post profit rates should be associated with a decrease in the variance of
the investment rate. Before empirically exploring this idea, it is valuable to show formally that
such a prediction is implied by the model presented in Section 2.
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Based on the notation introduced in Section 2, the log of the real profit rate in market Z can
be expressed as in equation (15).
Z tr(z)t+] )ogK() = p(z t+]- Pt+]-(l- (J)k(z)t+]
Z t+1
(15)
tr(Z)t+l is the real operating profit at time t+l, and K(Z)t+1 is the level of the capital stock. Using
the specification of equilibrium prices given by equation (8) in conjunction with equation (15), the
cross-sectional variance of the (log) profit rate can then be expressed as in (16):
varz(IOg tr(Z)t+l J= (1: +(p -l/12,t(~ + (1- (J)J)2 (12
K(Z)t+l r r r
(16)
The main element to notice from equation (16) is that, through l/12,t' the cross-sectional
variance of the profit rate can be shown to be positively related to monetary instability. In other
words, the partial derivative of varz(zog tr(Z)t+1 ) with respect to 'ft is positive. Therefore, using
K(Z)t+1
linear approximation of (16), equation (12) can be rewritten to express the relationship between
cross-sectional variance of the investment rate and the cross-sectional variance of the profit rate.
This relationship is given by equation (17):
(17)
with /3; < O.
Equation (17) indicates that an increase in the cross-sectional variance of the profit rate
should be associated with a contemporaneous decrease in the cross-sectional variance of the
investment rate. This partial correlation prediction reflects the fact that as the informational content
of prices goes down, the investment flows should be less effective in equating profit rates across
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finns. In order to test this prediction, we therefore need to extract an estimate of the cross-
sectional distribution of the profit rate using our panel data.2o
The results of regressing the variance of the investment rate on the contemporaneous and
lagged variance of operating profits (VARPRt ) are presented in Table 5. The coefficients are both
negative and jointly significantly different from zero at the 5% level (F2,15 =3.77). Note that the
coefficient of VARPRt is more than twice as large than the coefficient of VARPRt- 1. In this case,
a 50% increase in the standard deviation of the log profit rate leads, approximately, to a 70%
cumulative increase in the standard deviation of the investment rate after two Periods. These
results are again supportive of the predictions of our theoretical model.
It is worth noting that the results presented in table 5 are particularly supportive of the
imperfect infonnation story we are advocating as opposed to a credit rationing view. For example,
if the alternative hypothesis is that time-variation in the cross-sectional distribution of investment is
due mostly to changes in the importance of credit rationing, then we would eXPect the cross-
sectional variance of the profit rate (which reflects availability of internal funds for investment) to
be positively related to the cross-sectional variance of the investment rate. As seen in Table 5, this
is not the case.
5. Conclusions
This paper has focused on the effect of the informational content of prices on the
distribution of investment across firms. In order to explain the distributional movements in the
investment rate, we have developed a simple model whose objective is to formalize how monetary
20Profits are defined here as gross of depreciation and interest payments and are therefore equal to total revenue minus
labor and material costs.
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uncertainty may affect the allocation of investment. The model implies that as the money supply
process becomes more predictable, the firm's own relative price, and hence its profit
opportunities, become easier to forecast. This should cause the cross-sectional distribution of
investment to widen, since improved information allows firms to channel investment towards most
profitable opportunities. Correspondingly, our empirical work has concentrated on explaining the
changes in the dispersion of the investment rate in the UK over the Period 1970-90, where we have
documented that dispersion decreased in the 1970's, at times of greater uncertainty, and widened in
the 1980's. We have also documented that the variance of the investment rate moved procyclically.
Formal support for the model comes both from panel data analysis and from more macro-
level evidence. First, both the anecdotal approach and simple ARCH models for aggregate prices
and money suggests that the 1970's were a period of greater price uncertainty, following adverse
supply shocks and the frequent changes in macroeconomic policy. Furthermore, econometric
estimation shows that the conditional variance of inflation is inversely related to the variance of the
investment rate. The direction of the effect of the conditional variance of money growth is also
consistent with our model but is not statistically significant. The implications of the model also
receive empirical support from the significant negative correlation between the variance of the
investment rate and the variance of the log of profit rate calculated using panel data. We have
shown that the latter is positively related to the conditional variance of the money supply process in
our model. Hence, we believe that this paper provides some clear and intuitive evidence in support
of the view that monetary instability, through its effect on the predictability of prices, may hinder
the efficient allocation of investment.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Investment Rate: Fully Unbalanced Sample
Year First Decile First Quartile Median Third Quartile Ninth Decile 51. Deviation
70 0.0593702 0.0916327 0.1506388 0.2291485 0.3859956 0.1820293
71 0.0504 0.0800701 0.1310631 0.2032876 0.2794073 0.1501892
72 0.0501744 0.0824727 0.1175461 0.1791757 0.3366428 0.1741477
73 0.0602901 0.0981579 0.1474091 0.2293334 0.4068373 0.1841503
74 0.0639978 0.0924183 0.1326193 0.196028 0.2942984 0.1247627
75 0.0428498 0.064069 0.0956758 0.1411739 0.2173296 0.1040252
76 0.0368674 0.0545723 0.0823007 0.1226761 0.1834596 0.0908516
77 0.0376044 0.0565347 0.0888437 0.1298134 0.1900294 0.0892566
78 0.0388547 0.0631961 0.0936925 0.1466438 0.2359818 0.1133048
79 0.0397738 0.0637992 0.0985049 0.151746 0.2438959 0.1068238
80 0.0353441 0.0567081 0.0907294 0.1351026 0.2124935 0.1204439
81 0.0192125 0.0363973 0.0626341 0.1004968 0.160443 0.0859395
82 0.0189571 0.0343797 0.0598887 0.1005756 0.1602938 0.1008339
83 0.0181881 0.034911 0.062587 0.109339 0.1823268 0.1302451
84 0.0214495 0.0388438 0.0727986 0.1240254 0.2290676 0.1972255
85 0.0249947 0.0452848 0.0792575 0.1492071 0.2750991 0.175432
86 0.0312454 0.0515069 0.0882483 0.1595929 0.3007228 0.2265405
87 0.0385949 0.067474 0.1110532 0.1949724 0.4260598 0.3932503
88 0.0505395 0.0832328 0.1444983 0.2762583 0.5709153 0.4764219
89 0.0538838 0.0899494 0.143725 0.2639919 0.4841842 0.5253997
90 0.0458194 0.0734464 0.119559 0.1968998 0.3238128 0.3028823
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Table 2a: Total number of firms in each sample (by year)
Year Entry-Exit21 No Entry-Exit Entry-No Exit No Entry-No Exit
70 312 312 251 251
71 327 312 262 251
72 338 308 273 251
73 518 296 431 251
74 545 286 462 251
75 579 281 498 251
76 597 276 521 251
77 588 271 527 251
78 603 264 555 251
79 606 260 573 251
80 591 251 591 251
Year Entry-Exit No Entry-Exit Entry-No Exit No Entry-No Exit
80 591 591 238 238
81 575 555 247 238
82 563 523 256 238
83 537 473 269 238
84 517 432 279 238
85 520 404 303 238
86 513 367 337 238
87 507 334 367 238
88 506 301 412 238
89 474 272 424 238
90 424 238 424 238
21 The Enrty-Exit column reports the sample size in each year for the sample that allows both entry and exit. The
other columns can be similarly interpreted.
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Table 2b: Number of entering and exiting firms
Number of Exiting Firms: Number of Entering Firms:
Years Entry-Exit No Entry-Exit Years Entry-Exit Entry-No Exit
Sample Sample Sample Sample
70 0 0 70 312 251
71 4 4 71 15 11
72 12 12 72 15 11
73 11 10 73 192 158
74 5 5 74 38 31
75 9 5 75 39 36
76 16 5 76 27 23
77 13 7 77 8 7
78 15 4 78 27 27
79 33 9 79 19 19
80 591 251 80 17 17
Number of Exiting Firms: Number of Entering Firms:
Years Entry-Exit No Entry-Exit Years Entry-Exit Entry-No Exit
Sample Sample Sample Sample
80 35 35 80 591 238
81 33 33 81 20 9
82 49 49 82 20 9
83 43 41 83 24 13
84 33 28 84 23 10
85 46 37 85 36 24
86 42 34 86 39 34
87 46 33 87 35 30
88 44 29 88 45 45
89 50 34 89 12 12
90 424 238 90 0 0
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Table 3: Models for Inflation and Money Growth.
Part A: Testing for the Existence of ARCH Effects l ,2
logCPIt logM4t
LM statistics for p = 6 34.945* LM statistics for p =4 29.404*
Part B: ML Estimates3
YI bl b2 b3 b4 bs b6 ao at
logCPIt 4 0.361 0.108 0.1557 -0.0348 0.0616 0.0937 6.203E-6* 0.829*
(10.344) (4.8) (5.853) (1.539) (2.494) (3.763) (7.686) (15.352)
logM4t 0.432 0.245 0.284 0.0449 3.89E-4 0.559
(3.63) (2.187) (2.119) (0.599) (29.248) (1.882)
6
Esimated model for logCPI: YI ="Lf3;YI -; + EI ;
;=1
4
Esimated model for logM4: Yt = "Lf3iYt-i + Et ;
i=1
(
8 8 . J-I 2hI = ao + a 1 "L--E,-;
;=1 36
1All variables are in log differences.
2 * denotes rejections of constant conditional variance at the 1% significance level.
3t ratios are given in parenthesis.
4Season1dummies are also included in the estimation.
Table 4a: Effect of the Conditional Variance of Inflation on the Variance of the Investment Rate; I Dependent
Variable: Var(l/Kt_I ), Estimation period: 1972-1990
Re essors Coefficients
CVCPIt_12 -129.17
(-1.75)3
CVCPIt_2 -161.6
(-2.42)
F2,l5 5.40
R2 35.6%
DW 1.72
1 The regression includes a general intercept and it allows for an intercept shift after 1980
2 CVCPlt denotes the conditional variance of the inflation rate as measured by the CPI.
3 t ratios in parenthesis.
Table 4b: Effect of the Conditional Variance ofM4 on the Variance of the Investment Rate:! Dependent Variable:
VarCIt/Kt- J), Estimation period: 1972-1990
Re essors Coefficients
CVM4t_1 -46.45
(-0.93)
CVM4t_2 -75.086
(-1.36)
F2,l5 1.021
-2 2.58%R
DW 1.301
ICVM4t denotes the conditional variance of M4. See, also, footnotes to Table 4a.
Table 5: Relationship Between the Cross-Sectional Variance of the Investment Rate and the
Rate: 1 Dependent Variable: Var(I/Kt-I)~ Estimation period: 1971-1990
Re ressors Coefficients
Variance of the Profit
var(IOgi)
K t - 1
var(IOg 1rt - 1 )
Kt - 2
F2,l5
-2R
DW
-0.0489
(-3.24)
-0.0213
(-1.45)
5.744
33.3%
1.76
n
1 __t_ denotes the ooperating profit to capital ratio. See, also, footnotes to Table 4a.
Kt - 1
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ESSAY II
An Analysis of the Istanbul Bourse
Co-authored with S. Gilrcan Gillen.
I. Introduction
In a recent survey by The Wall Street Journal (September 24, 1993), the Istanbul Bourse,
with more than 160 listed issues and a total capitalization of $22.88 billion, is considered to be one
of the largest and most dynamic emerging markets in Europe. Turkish government has played its
role in bringing the stock market to that stage by granting tax incentives to mutual funds and by
educating retail investors. The government has also rendered investing in the Istanbul Bourse
attractive for foreign investors by allowing them to repatriate their capital and income freely. Also,
the dramatic transition in Turkey from a rural to an urban economy has contributed to increased
interest in Turkish financial market. Turkish Investment Fund, a $72 million closed-end country
fund which trade like ordinary stocks in NYSE, has outperformed all others of its kind through the
third quarter in 1993. The fund's shares have doubled since the beginning of the year (The Wall
Street Journal, October 5, 1993). Despite all these positive developments, the Istanbul Bourse, as
any other new stock market, can be expected to be infested by inefficiencies due to unestablished
professional brokerage systems, or information asymmetries. In this context, we are interested to
see whether this is really the case or, on the contrary, the Istanbul Bourse is efficient.
A market is said to be efficient (in the weak sense) if past information on prices does not
provide an opportunity for forecasting future price movements. Economists have spent
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considerable effort testing the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). One of the earliest and most
common tests is the random walk model for stock prices which classifies the market in a particular
stock as 'weak-form-efficient' if that stock's price follows a random walk.26 Lehmann (1990, p.
1) offers an alternative method in which he asserts that II ••• systematic changes in fundamental
valuation over intervals, like a week, should not occur in efficient markets". He then tests his
theory by examining security prices for evidence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities. Mankiw,
Romer and Shapiro (1991) use tests of stock market forecastability and volatility in testing the
EMH. Attanasio (1991, p. 479) bases a test on the idea that "... excess returns should be
predictable only if risk, and therefore second moments, are predictable. II Despite the differences in
their methodology, all of these studies are based on the same premise: in an efficient market,
prices should not be predictable from their past history.
To test efficiency in the Istanbul Bourse, we will employ cointegration tests and carry out a
forecasting exercise in which the forecasting performance of an error correction mechanism (ECM)
incorporating the information from cointegrating relationship is compared to that of a martingale.
Cointegration indicates the existence of an ECM implying that at least one of the prices can be used
to predict another (see Granger, 1986) and the martingale just uses today's price as the best
predictor of tomorrow's price. In other words, incorporating the information from a cointegrating
relationship is expected to improve forecasts compared to those of the martingale.
Cerchi and Havenner (1988) followed a technique due to Aoki (1987) to analyze the
dynamic behavior of five stock prices from Wall Street data. They observed that although each
stock price series seemed to follow a simple random walk, they were cointegrated and shared a
common trend. Cerchi and Havenner also found that the series shared three cyclic states based on
26 See Fama (1970) for a review.
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Aoki's system-theoretic time series procedure. Additionally, a model incorporating the information
from common trend and cycles provided good one-month-ahead forecasts for the 24 months
following the estimation period. These findings are not consistent with the EMH.
In the present paper, we apply Johansen's cointegration technique to twelve asset prices
from the Istanbul Menkul Kiymetler Borsasi (the Istanbul Bourse) along with the exchange rate
between the V.S. Dollar and the Turkish Lira. We include the dollar-lira exchange rate, because
the V.S. dollar is considered as an alternative instrument of investment and is traded in great
volumes on a daily basis in Turkey. Then, we compare the out-of-sample forecasting performance
of a vector error correction mechanism (VECM) with that of a martingale process. Test results
show that all twelve assets and some economically related subgroups appear to move together in
the long run.27 However, the use of information from the cointegrating relationship does not
improve forecasts: the martingale outperforms the VECM. In light of these results, we conclude
that the Istanbul Bourse is weak-form-efficient.
The layout of the paper is as follows: Section II gives a brief description of cointegration,
and discusses the relevance of forecasting to market efficiency. The data, the econometric
methodology and the results are presented in Section III. Section IV concludes the paPer.
II. Cointegration, Forecasting and the EMH.
A. Cointegration
The idea that a linear combination of nonstationary series can be stationary, i.e. that the
series are cointegrated, gains special importance when we consider the stylized fact that most
macroeconomic time series are nonstationary and integrated of order one (denoted I( 1)). In this
27 All groups include the exchange rate in addition to asset prices.
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context, cointegration implies that a certain linear combination of two or more nonstationary series
should be stationary, i.e. integrated of order 0 (denoted 1(0». So, if xt and Yt are two 1(1) series
and they are cointegrated, there is a 'cointegrating parameter' b such that Zt =xt - byt is 1(0), or Zt
is stationary. This is evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between xt and Ye Granger
(1986) and Engle and Granger (1987) show that if two variables are cointegrated, an error
correction representation must exist:
(1)
where A(L) and B(L) are finite polynomials in the lag operator L, e lt and e2t are joint white noise
and Ir11+lr21 O. 28
The last condition rules out the possibility of both r1 and r2 being equal to zero. This
implies that there must be Granger causality in at least one direction, since Zt-l will appear in at
least one of the equations in (1), implying that knowledge of Zt can be used to predict xl' yt' or
both.
B. Forecasting and Market Efficiency
In the literature, the existence of a cointegrating relationship among stock prices has been
considered as an indication of inefficiency in the market. However the relevant standard of
28 In case of more than two cointegrating variables, the analysis is quite easy to generalize as
described in Granger (1986). However, in that case one would have a 'cointegrating vector' instead
of a 'cointegrating parameter'. In fact, as Johansen (1988) points out if there are n variables, it is
possible to have n-l cointegrating vectors.
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efficiency is that of predictability of future prices. If Keynes is right in claiming that most
investors are interested in accruing high returns in short term transactions, the knowledge of a
long-run equilibrium relationship is not relevant for them. Kosmicke (1984) believes that the
majority of the stock market consists of investors who think that expected return is accrued by
short-run price changes rather than long-run income flows. Accordingly, he criticizes empirical
studies which do not separate the sample into data produced by investors who forecast short-run
price changes and data produced by investors who forecast long-run income flows, since these
former data cannot provide any evidence for or against the EMH. De Bondt (1991) supports the
overreaction hypothesis and claims that the average forecast has no predictive power. He shows
that a naive approach of predicting an increase every period beats more sophisticated forecasting
models. According to Keane (1991, p. 34) "[t]he most significant lesson of recent market history
is that unexplained price behavior is not necessarily irrational, and that irrational behavior is not
necessarily exploitable..." In other words, although faith in the rationality of market behavior can
be undermined due to empirical oddities, this does not imply that the market is exploitable.
All this discussion leads one to compare the prediction power of the specific model believed
to represent the market behavior with the prediction power of a martingale benchmark. If the
specific model's forecasts are not superior to those of the benchmark, then the additional
information used to build that model is not worth exploiting. In the context of the present paper, if
forecasts of future prices which incorporate cointegration fail to improve on the benchmark
martingale process, the additional information from this long-run equilibrium relationship is not
useful to investors, in that it fails to identify any arbitrage opportunities that might lead to positive
profits.
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III. Empirical Findings
A. Data
The daily data for twelve asset prices are taken from the IMKB database and run from
January 2nd, 1989 to October 29th, 1991 for 663 days on which the market was open. The data
for the dollar-lira exchange rate are the official rate of the Turkish Central Bank and cover the same
period. The price series are for the following assets: Ak~imento [1], Ar~elik [2], Bagfas [3],
C;elik [4], C;ukurova [5], Eregli Demir C;elik [6], Izocam [7], Kartonsan [8], Ko~ Holding [9],
Ko~ Yatirim [10], Otosan [11] and Tiirkiye Devlet Demiryollari [12]. From now onwards, the
asset prices will be referred to by the numbers assigned to them in brackets. The exchange rate
will be numbered as [13].
B. Econometric Methodology
This paper follows the econometric methodology described in Johansen (1988) and
Johansen and Juselius (1990). The series of interest will be the natural logarithms of stock prices
and the exchange rate. The first step is to test the null hypothesis that each series is I( 1), i.e. they
each possess a unit root. However, to guarantee that these series do not have more than one unit
root, the test procedure of Dickey and Pantula (1987) for a second unit root is used. This test
involves the following regression:
(2)
where DXt =xt - xt-1' D
2xt =DXt - Dxt_1• and et is the error term.
The test statistic is the ratio of b, the least squares estimate of b, to se(b), its standard error
obtained from least squares. The second unit root will be rejected if this statistic is less than the
relevant critical value. Once the possibility of more than one unit root is ruled out, the following
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equation, based on the studies by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981), can be estimated to test for the
unit root:
DXt = a + bXt-1 + ±djDXt_j + et
j=l
(3)
where p is selected in order to render et empirically white. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test
statistic is the same as defined in the Dickey-Pantula test, b/se(b), and the same critical values are
appropriate.
To test for cointegration among the variables, Johansen's cointegration procedure is
preferred over the method of Engle and Granger (1987) for two reasons. First, Johansen's
approach involves full-information maximum likelihood estimation that treats all variables in the
system as endogenous, avoiding the arbitrary normalization inherent in Engle and Granger's OLS
based method. Second, one can find all existing cointegrating vectors in the system by using
Johansen's technique, whereas OLS can only locate one cointegrating vector, or may fail to detect
a cointegrating relationship, dePending on the choice of regressand.
Johansen bases his analysis on the following vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
(4)
where el' ... ,eT are independent p-dimensional Gaussian variables with mean zero and
covariance matrix L, Xt is a (px1) random vector and X_k+1, ... , Xo are fixed. PI,"" Pk are
(pxp) matrices of parameters and m is a unit vector. Model (4) can be rewritten in first
differences:
(5)
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where Gi =- ( I - PI - ... - Pi ) for i =1, ... , k-l and P =- ( I - PI - ... - Pk ).
The parameter matrix, P, contains information about long-run relationships between the
variables in the system. If the rank(P) = p, i.e. P is full rank, all variables in Xt are stationary. If,
on the other hand, rank(P) =0, model (5) corresponds to a VAR in first differences. Finally, if 0
< rank(P) =r < p there are (pxr) matrices a and b such that P =ab'. b is the matrix of
cointegrating vectors which render b'Xt stationary, even though Xt is non-stationary, and a is a
matrix of error correction parameters.
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) have shown that under the hypothesis
"'-
that P = ab', f3, the maximum likelihood estimate ofb, is found by solving the following
eigenvalue problem:
IISkk - SkOSOO-I SOk I =0,
where Soo =the residual moment matrix from the least squares regression
of DXt on DXt_b"" DXt-k+I ' and 1,
Skk =the residual moment matrix from the least squares regression
of Xt- I on DXt_b ... , DXt_k+1 ' and 1,
SOk =the cross-product residual moment matrix.
(6)
The eigenvectors corresponding to the r largest, statistically significant eigenvalues
constitute [J. The number of statistically significant eigenvalues can be found using two different
likelihood ratio tests which complement each other. The likelihood ratio test statistic for the null
hypothesis H2(r) : rank(P) r, against the full-rank alternative HI: rank(P) =pis:
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(7)
i =r+l
where i r+ 1, ... , i p are the p-r smallest eigenvalues of the problem (6). Equation (7) is the trace
statistic employed to test whether there are at most r cointegrating relationships. The likelihood
ratio test statistic for the null hypothesis H2(r), against the alternative H2(r+ 1): rank(P) r+1 is:
,..
-2In(Q; H 2(r)IH2(r+l) = -T In(1 - Ar+l) (8)
Equation (8) is the maximum eigenvalue statistic used to test whether there are at most r or
(r+1) cointegrating relationships.
Once the existence of cointegration among the variables is established, it is straightforward
to construct the VECM and to perform out-of-sample forecasts imposing the number of
cointegrating relationships throughout the forecast period. To perform the forecasts, we estimate
parameters of the model using observations 1 through 495, and then recursively reestimate every 5
periods. In each subsequent period, 1,5, 10, 15, and 20 step-ahead forecasts are constructed
treating the parameters as fixed at their estimated values. The forecasts obtained from VECM are
then compared with that of a benchmark martingale process. In order to make a judgment about
relative performance, we consider two criteria: the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE),
and the mean absolute prediction error (MAPE). RMSPE and MAPE are the most commonly used
statistics to measure the predictive power of a forecasting model and they are simple to implement.
C. Results
Table 1 and Table 2 present the results for unit root tests. The statistics reported in Table 1
are those described in Section III-B for the Dickey-Pantula second unit root test. The critical
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values given for this table are derived from MacKinnon (1990) for our sample size of 663. The
results show that none of the series has a second unit root: the null hypothesis of nonstationarity
of the second differences is rejected at one percent level for all of the series.
The results of Table 2 show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the series are
integrated of order one for any of the series at the one percent level (using the same critical values
as in Table 1). On the other hand, the number of lags {p} used in equation (3), to render the
residuals approximately white, is greater than zero for series [1], [4], [5], [6], [12], and [13].29
The results of cointegration tests for some economically interesting combinations as well as
for all twelve assets can be seen in Table 3. All systems include the exchange rate in addition to
asset prices. We exclude day-of-week dummies from the estimated systems since they are not
significant even at the ten percent level based on likelihood ratio tests. There seems to be evidence
for a common movement of the asset prices along with the exchange rate in the long run.30 A
summary of the results follows:
29 This is evidence that these seven series do not follow simple random walks. To further examine
these results, we estimate the following autoregressive equation for the residuals obtained from
equation (3) with p =0 for each of the fourteen series: et =det_1 + Ut. Except for [7] and [8], d, the
least squares estimate of d, is significantly different than zero. So et is white noise for only [7] and
[8].
30 The existence of the exchange rate in cointegrating relationships is tested and validated.
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Combination
I
II
III
N
V
VI
vn
Assets Included in the Combination
All assets.
All assets except the state economic
enterprises [3], [6] and [12].
KOc; conglomerate ([2], [9] and [10]).
Construction sector ([1], [4] and [6]).
Extended construction sector ([1], [4],
[6] and [7]).
Steel&lron and state railways ([4], [6]
and [12]).
State economic enterprises ([3], [6] and
[12]).
Result
Single cointegrating relationship.
Single cointegrating relationship.
No cointegrating relationship.
Single cointegrating relationship.
Two cointegrating relationships.
Single cointegrating relationship.
No cointegrating relationship.
Table 4 reports ratios of the martingale's RMSPE and MAPE statistics to the corresponding
measures for the VECM for each asset and for each forecasting horizon. A ratio which is greater
than one implies that VECM outperforms (has a smaller error than) the martingale, and vice versa.
The ratios are marked for the cases in which VECM performed better or the same as martingale.
Of the 65 combinations, VECM forecast is more accurate in only one instance based on the
RMSPE criterion; 5-step forecasting for asset [8]. According to the MAPE criterion, the VECM
forecast dominates in the following cases: 1- and 5-step for asset [8], 5-step for asset [12], and 5-
and 10-step for the exchange rate (asset [13]). Also, VECM performed as well as martingale, i.e.
both have the same MAPE, in forecasting 15 and 20-steps ahead for the exchange rate. These
correspond to only seven cases out of 65. Clearly, the forecasting performance of the benchmark
martingale, which does not impose any cointegrating relationship, is almost always superior. It is
very likely that instances of superior VECM performance are a result of sampling variation. Next,
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we summarize results of Table 4 in the form of averages over five different forecasting horizons
for each of 13 assets:
Assets
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
All Assets
Ratio ofRMSPE from
martingale to RMSPE from
VECM
0.873
0.871
0.881
0.891
0.883
0.805
0.923
0.959
0.799
0.880
0.941
0.907
0.940
0.889
Ratio of MAPE from
martingale to MAPE from
VECM
0.869
0.928
0.868
0.900
0.923
0.851
0.894
0.987
0.798
0.885
0.922
0.958
1.000
0.906
The result is clear: the forecasting performance of martingale is superior. There are no
ratios exceeding unity for either measure; in only one case the MAPE ratio is equal to unity, that
of the exchange rate (asset [13]). Over all assets, the superiority of martingale's performance is
apparent. Another summary measure of Table 4 can be obtained by averaging over 13 assets for
each of five different forecasting horizons:
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Forecast Horizon
I-step
5-step
IO-step
15-step
20-step
Ratio of RMSPE from
martingale to RMSPE from
VECM
0.778
0.928
0.907
0.916
0.902
Ratio of MAPE from
martingale to MAPE from
VECM
0.851
0.932
0.908
0.911
0.891
There is an apparent improvement in the forecasting performance of VECM relative to that
of martingale as we go from shorter to longer horizons, as one would expect from a long-run
relationship. VECM's best performance relative to martingale is the 5-step ahead forecast. Also
note that its performance in longer horizons improves compared to I-step ahead forecasting.
However, there is still no ratio greater than one, which implies that martingale performs better than
the VECM at each forecasting horizon.
This forecasting exercise is also carried out for the other combinations found to be
cointegrated (IT, IV, V and VI). Similar results are obtained. Except for few isolated cases, the
forecasting performance of martingale is superior.31
IV. Conclusion
The fact that variables are cointegrated implies the existence of Granger-causality in at least
one direction among those variables through an error correcting mechanism. In particular, if prices
in a certain market are cointegrated, the error correction mechanism shows us that at least one of
the prices can be used to forecast another. In our analysis, the system with twelve asset prices
31 The forecast results for these combinations are available from the authors upon request.
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from the Istanbul Bourse and dollar-lira exchange rate is found to be cointegrated. However, use
of the error correction model incorporating the information from the cointegrating relationship does
not improve forecasts over univariate martingale predictions. Although there is information to be
exploited about long-term prices, it is unlikely that investors could profitably use it to take
advantage of arbitrage opportunities. In other words, investors do not find this information worth
exploiting, or they are involved in short-term transactions and the long run information is simply
irrelevant for them. In any event, today's price still seems to be the best predictor for tomorrow's
price.
As new data, covering a larger set of asset prices for a longer horizon, become available we
plan to carry out the same analysis. The longer data will allow us to extend the forecasting exercise
to a longer horizon, in which case a more elaborate analysis of forecasting performance of the
VECM can be carried out. After all it is a long run relationship and it is expected to perform better
than the martingale at longer horizons. In the present paper, we have evidence for a relative
improvement in VECM's performance as we go from shorter to longer horizons, but the martingale
is still superior. By using the longer data, one might be able to locate a threshold horizon at which
the long run relationship becomes dominant and VECM forecasts dominate those of the martingale.
48
References:
Aoki, M. (1987) State Space Modeling of the Time Series (Berlin: Springer-Verlag).
Attanasio, O. P. (1991) Risk, Time-Varying Second Moments and Market Efficiency, Review of
Economic Studies, 58, 479-94.
Cerchi, M. and A. Havenner. (1988) Cointegration and Stock Prices: The Random Walk on Wall
Street Revisited, Journal ofEconomic Dynamics and Control, 12, 333-46.
Coleman, M. (1990) Cointegration Based Tests of Daily Foreign Exchange Market Efficiency,
Economics Letters, 32, 53-59.
De Bondt, W. F. M. (1991) What Do Economists Know About the Stock Market, The Journal of
Portfolio Management, 17, 84-90.
Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuller. (1979) Distribution of Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series
with a Unit Root, Journal ofAmerican Statistical Association, 84,427-31.
Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuller. (1981) Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time Series
with a Unit Root, Econometrica, 49, 1057-72.
Dickey, D. A. and S. G. Pantula. (1987) Determining the Order of Differencing in Autoregressive
Processes, Journal ofBusiness and Economic Statistics, 5, 455-61.
Engle, R. F. and C. W. J. Granger. (1987) Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation,
Estimation and Testing, Econometrica, 55, 251-76.
Fama, E.F. (1970) Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, Journal
of Finance, 25,383-417.
Granger, C.W.J. (1986) Developments in the Study of Cointegrated Economic Variables, Oxford
Bulletin ofEconomics and Statistics, 48 ,213-25.
Johansen, S. (1988) Statistical Analysis of Cointegrating Vectors, Journal ofEconomic Dynamics
and Control, 12, 231-54.
49
Johansen, S. and K. Juselius. (1990) Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inference on
Cointegration - With Applications to the Demand for Money, Oxford Bulletin ofEconomics and
Statistics, 52, 169-210.
Keane, S. M. (1991) Paradox in the Current Crisis in Efficient Market Theory, The Journal of
Portfolio Management, 17, 30-34.
Kosmicke, R. (1984) The Contradiction Between Keynes and EMH, The Journal ofPortfolio
Management, 11,41-43.
Lehmann, B. N. (1990) Fads, Martingales and Market Efficiency, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 105, 1-28.
MacDonald, R. and M. P. Taylor. (1989) Foreign Exchange Market Efficiency and Cointegration:
Some Evidence from the Recent Float, Economics Letters, 29, 63-68.
MacKinnon, J. G. (1991) Critical Values for Cointegration Tests, Ch. 13 in Long-run Economic
Relationships: Readings in Cointegration (Ed.) R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D. and M. D. Shapiro. (1991) Stock Market Forecastibility and
Volatility: A Statistical Appraisal, Review ofEconomic Studies, 58, 455-77.
The Wall Street Journal Reports, September 24,1993.
50
Asset
Table 1- Second Unit Root Test Results.a
Dickey-Pantula
Test Statistics
Number of La s
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
Table 2-
Asset
-23.074
-22.533
-21.916
-23.518
-21.784
-20.850
-24.327
-24.252
-21.359
-22.213
-22.554
-21.607
-19.152
Unit Root Test Results.b
ADFTest
Statistics
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
-1.829
-1.509
-2.101
-2.082
-2.147
-2.529
-1.977
-2.135
-1.647
-1.169
-1.656
-1.236
2.962
{4}
to}
to}
{ 1}
{ 1}
{ 1}
to}
to}
to}
to}
to}
{ 1}
{5}
a,b Critical values derived from MacKinnon (1991) are
-3.443, -2.866, -2.569 for 1%, 5% and 10% significance
level respectively.
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Table 4 - Comparison of forecasting performances of martingale model and vector error
correction mechanism (VECM) obtained from Johansen procedure.
Assets Steps Ratio of RMSPE from Ratio of MAPE from
martingale to RMSPE from martingale to MAPE from
VECM VECM
(1) 1 0.802 0.763
5 0.916 0.916
10 0.894 0.897
15 0.879 0.890
20 0.871 0.869
(2) 1 0.666 0.746
5 0.959 0.978
10 0.936 0.994
15 0.924 0.978
20 0.890 0.931
(3) 1 0.695 0.767
5 0.956 0.929
10 0.932 0.893
15 0.920 0.874
20 0.903 0.862
(4) 1 0.725 0.757
5 0.971 0.976
10 0.939 0.943
15 0.922 0.926
20 0.895 0.881
(5) 1 0.660 0.849
5 0.952 0.966
10 0.952 0.943
15 0.967 0.943
20 0.936 0.906
(6) 1 0.798 0.909
5 0.814 0.852
10 0.782 0.822
15 0.821 0.842
20 0.813 0.836
(7) 1 0.992 0.988
5 0.871 0.854
10 0.878 0.842
15 0.925 0.882
20 0.952 0.914
(8) 1 0.946 < 1.013 >
5 <1.017> <1.045>
10 0.976 0.990
15 0.951 0.979
20 0.908 0.920
(9) 1 0.634 0.796
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5 0.867 0.829
10 0.833 0.784
15 0.859 0.799
20 0.845 0.784(10) 1 0.764 0.875
5 0.914 0.901
10 0.879 0.871
15 0.907 0.884
20 0.921 0.892(11) 1 0.866 0.904
5 0.953 0.934
10 0.945 0.919
15 0.969 0.929
20 0.959 0.921(12) 1 0.839 0.887
5 0.950 < 1.005 >
10 0.925 0.977
15 0.926 0.978
20 0.897 0.944
(13) 1 0.911 0.946
5 0.940 < 1.024 >
10 0.937 <1.011>
15 0.938 < 1.000 >
20 0.955 < 1.000 >
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Essay III
INVESTMENT IN AN OPEN ECONOMY WITH
IMPERFECT COMPETITION
I. Introduction
The Q theory of investment is based on the idea that the incentive to invest depends on the
market value of capital relative to the cost of acquiring the capital. If an additional unit of capital
raises the market value of the firm by more than the cost of that capital, then the firm should invest
in it. The greater the amount by which the valuation of the capital exceeds its cost, the greater is
the incentive to invest. The data, however, indicate that the actual behavior of firms is inconsistent
with the simple version of Q theory. This has led to various extensions. Abel and Blanchard
(1986) study the relationship between marginal Q and investment instead of average Q (see
Hayashi 1982). Richer technological specifications are introduced by Wildasin (1984) and
Chirinko (1987) and Hayashi and Inoue (1990). The relationship between investment and
financing decisions is investigated by Hayashi (1985) and Fazzari et ale (1988). Recently, the
assumption of competitive output markets has been replaced with the assumption of monopolistic
competition. The specification and estimation of the resulting model was examined by Chirinko
and Fazzari (1988), Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) and Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1991),
hereafter GS.
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All of these studies provide a more complete understanding of how to model the capital
investment decision of a firm. We can further enhance our understanding by incorporating into
investment models the observation that firms compete and sell their output in separate markets;
domestic and foreign markets. In fact, if we look at trade data, in general, we see that there is a
two-way trade of similar goods between most industrialized countries.32 Particularly, by the mid
1970s, most US firms relied on export sales and/or faced an international competitor in their
domestic market. Therefore, it is essential that we include this observation when modeling the
investment decision of a firm.
For the present paper, it is convenient to employ the framework used by Galeotti and
Schiantarelli (1991), which assumes that it is costly to adjust employment as well as the capital
stock, in order to show that the existence of separate markets and of a rival producer affect the
investment decision of a firm when the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition does not hold.
The assumption of no PPP, that is the ratio of domestic and foreign market prices does not equal
the exchange rate, is important for our purposes. This allows for the fact that firms may price
discriminate between their output markets.33 If PPP holds, our model reduces to the generalized Q
model developed by GS. We also assume that the product price in the output market will be
denominated in the local currency.
The theoretical analysis developed here assumes a duopoly regime in each output market
and the absence ofPPP. The investment decision rule obtained from the theoretical analysis is
32The increasing volume of two-way trade has attracted the attention of trade
theorists over the last decade, for example see Markusen (1981), Brander (1981),
Brander and Krugman (1983), Brander and Spencer (1983).
33See Tirole (1990) for a brief discussion about price discrimination.
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estimated using a generalized method of moments technique (GMM) for the U.S. manufacturing
sector. The parameter estimates have the expected sign, are significantly different from zero and
are robust to the choice of the instrument set. Additionally, a comparison with GS model, treating
both models consistently in terms of normalization, data set and the instruments employed in
estimation, provides evidence that our model is better able to explain the investment decision of the
firm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
theoretical analysis. Section three is devoted to the econometric specification, the empirical results,
model comparison and sensitivity analysis. Section four concludes the paper.
II. The Model with Duopoly in the Output Markets
The basic assumptions of the model are: (1) there is duopoly in the output market:
domestic and foreign firms compete and sell a homogeneous product in each other's output market;
(2) firms face convex internal costs of adjustment for capital and labor; (3) purchasing power
parity does not hold; (4) the price of the traded good in the foreign (resPectively in domestic)
market is denominated in foreign (respectively in domestic) currency.34
The output of both domestic firm (Y) and of foreign firm (Y*) is consumed in both
domestic and foreign markets. (Asterisks, in general, will denote variables associated with the
34Introducing exchange rate uncertainty into this framework would not
qualitatively change the results but would bring unnecessary complication.
Giovannini (1988) provides a theoretical framework which investigates the
relationship between exchange rates and traded good prices under exchange rate
uncertainty.
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foreign country.) We will denote the percent of output sold in the firm's established market by
a E [0,1] ( the rest will be sold in rival's market). Therefore the total product sold in the domestic
market will be Q~ =aY +(1- a*)Y* and that in the foreign market QJ = (1- a)Y + a*Y*. The
corresponding inverse demand functions will be denoted by P =p(Q~) and p* =p* (QJ),
respectively. Capital, employment, investment and gross hiring will be denoted by K, L, I and X.
The net production function is given by Y =F(K,L,I,X), where F[ < 0, FII < 0, Fx < 0, Fxx <
o.
The objective of the firm is to maximize the present value of cash flow while investment is
entirely financed by retained earnings. The net present value of the firm is:
where Et is the expectations operator conditional on the information set Or available at the
beginning of time t. Note that, the price of the product sold in domestic and foreign markets is a
choice variable for the frrm because the price depends on the total amount of the product sold in
k
each market.35 The discount rate, f3;k =TI (l +p)-I , is assumed to be non-stochastic with f3: =1
s=;
and p is the rate of return. The variable e represents the exchange rate. The price of new
investment goods is pI, the corporate tax rate is l' and the foreign tax rate on each unit sold abroad
35While reading the objective function, one should read Pr+j and P;+j as Pr+j(Qb) and
P;+/Q~), respectively. Because of space considerations the above representation was
chosen.
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is T"'. The present value of tax savings associated with depreciation allowances and tax credits on
a dollar of new investment is given by u. The present value of tax savings on accounting
depreciation to be claimed for investment made before period t is A. The present discounted value
of labor costs on workers hired from time t + j onward is:
-
Wt+j = L13tv+j+1 (1- Tv)Wv(1- ry-(t+j) ,
v=t+j
(2a)
where w is the labor cost per person and r is the exogenous quit rate for workers, which is
assumed to be constant. 13::1+1 is equal to one by definition. The present value of labor costs for
workers hired before time t, denoted by Bt , is defined as:
(2b)
Note that Bt is predetermined for the fmn at time t (see GS (1991)). Finally, the constraints of the
maximization problem for capital and employment levels are:
Kt =It + (1- b)Kt_l ,
Lt =Xt + (1- r)Lt-l ,
where 8 is the one-period depreciation rate on capital goods assumed to be constant.
(3a)
(3b)
The firm chooses optimal decision rules which determine investment and employment
levels, and the percentage of the product that will be sold in the domestic market in each time
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period t. Recall that price is a choice variable for frrms; thus we will denote the price elasticity of
output demand as c (c for the domestic market, c* for the foreign market). Maximizing equation
(1) subject to equations (3a) and (3b), the first order conditions for investment (I), gross hiring (X)
and percentage of the product sold in the domestic market (a) at time t are obtained as follows:36
I:Et{(1- rt)Pt(1- !L.)atF/ +(1- r;)etPt*(1- s~ )(1- at)F/ - (1- ut)p/ + A~} =0, (4a)
ct ct
X:Et{(1- rt)Pt(1- !L.)atFx +(1- r;)etPt*(1- s~ )(1- a,)Fx - ~t+ A;} =0, (4b)c, ct
a:Et{(1- rt)Pt(l-!L.) - (1- r;)etP; (1- S~)}=0, (4c)
c, ct
a Y . . * (1- a)Y
where St = --.!...;f denotes the domestic market share of the domestic firm, St = ; t denotes
~ ~
the foreign market share of the domestic firm, and A~ and A; are the Lagrange multipliers of
capital and employment, respectively. Note that equation (4a) defines the firm's optimal
investment decision. If A~ were known then one could estimate the investment decision rule of the
firm using equation (4a) as a function of both endogenous and exogenous variables. However,
A~ is not observable. Similarly, equation (4b) defines the firm's optimal hiring decision and A; is
not known. Thus, a relationship for the evolution of the shadow value of capital, A~, and that of
labor, A;, must be obtained. Equation (4c) defines the optimal percentage of the output to be sold
in the domestic market at each point in time. A careful look at equation (4c) reveals that the fmn
chooses to sell until its marginal revenues are equal in each market.
Finally, the other two first order conditions are:
36Provided that all investment goods are produced domestically.
61
K:Et{O- rt)PtO-!.L)atFK +(1- r;)etP;(1- St: )(1- at)FK + 1- 8 A~+l} =A~, (4d)
Ct ct 1+ Pt+l
L:Et{(1- rt)Pt(1- !.L)atFL +(1- r;)etP; (1- s~ )(1- at)FL + 1- r A~+l} =A~. (4e)
ct ct 1+Pt+l
Equations (4d) and (4e) give the evolution of the shadow price of the constraints. The evolution of
the shadow price of capital is related to the marginal cash flow from an extra unit of capital.37 If
one solves equation (4d) forward then A~ can be shown to be equal to the present value of the
marginal product of capital, taking into account that the frrm can sell in two markets. Similarly, the
evolution of the shadow price of employment is related to the marginal cash flow from an extra unit
of labor and A; is the price at which a marginal unit of labor might be hired or lent out.
Assuming that the net production function is homogeneous of degree one in K, L, I, X and
noting the structure of the value function, the following equation can be derived:38
where,
{
00 (1- r )P a.Y }
C =E ~f3t+j I+j /+j t+] r+j S .t t.£..J t t+J '
'0 £J= I~
(5)
(6a)
dV ~ . d1C· K37 _I = Lf3/+ j (l - 8)J~ = A , where
dK, j~O 1 dK/+ j 1
expression is equivalent to (4d).
38To obtain equation (5), multiply
make use of equation (4c).
1! . is the cash flow of the firm at time t+j. Thist+J
Equation (4e) can be derived similarly.
(4a) by It, (4b) by Xt' (4d) by K t, and (4e) by L t and
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(6b)
Equation (5) says that the adjusted market value of the fmn (V
t
- ~ + B
t
- C
t
- C
t
*) is equal to the
shadow price of the quasi-fixed factors, multiplied by their respective quantities. Note that Ct and
Ct* appear in equation (5) because of the assumption of imperfect competition. The previous
studies which modeled the investment decision rule of a firm operating in an imperfect output
market implicitly assumed at =1, leading to the exclusion of the effect of foreign sales on the
investment decision rule of the firm. Additionally, since we assume the output market is served by
both a domestic firm and a foreign rival firm, the domestic and foreign market shares of the firm
(St and s;, respectively) appear in equation (5) via Ct and Ct*. If there is no foreign firm in the
domestic market then St =1. Similarly, if the domestic firm is the sole producer for the foreign
market then s; =1. The assumption St =1 and St* =1 would lead to the exclusion of the effect
of a rival firm's behavior on the investment decision rule of the other.
Observe that price elasticity of demand enters in equations (6a) and (6b). Under the
conditions that the domestic firm operates in a perfectly competitive output market, the price
elasticity of output demand is ct =00, thus Ct = 0: a testable hypothesis. Similarly, if there is
prefect competition in the foreign output market, it is testable, as well. Another interesting point is
that if labor is not a quasi-fixed factor and output markets are perfectly comPetitive, then one
obtains the discrete time analog for average Q originally derived by Hayashi (1982).39
39In this case c
t
and C; and ).~ (1- S)Lt-I drop from equation (5).
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In order to obtain a reduced fonn equation, we will follow the literature and assume that the
adjustment costs are additively separable such that F(K,L,X,I) = j(K,L) - G(K,L,X,I). The
function j(.) denotes the gross production function, and G(.) denotes the adjustment cost
function for capital and employment. The adjustment cost for capital captures the notion that it is
more costly to increase the capital stock by a given amount quickly rather than slowly. Similarly,
the adjustment cost for employment can be thought to represent output lost due to employing an
inexperienced worker.
The investment rule of the fmn can be obtained substituting out the shadow prices of the
quasi-fixed factors in equation (5) using the first order conditions for investment, hiring, and
percentage of output sold, i.e., equations (4a), (4b) and (4c). Thus, the dynamic equation for
investment in terms of observable variables can be derived as follows:
E{G _(Vt-~)(1+P)
t I (1- 8)pIK
t t-1
+(Ct + Ct*)(1 +P)} =0,
K t - l (1- 8)Jt
) pI (1-)( L J1 u t + r t-l G( - ) (1- tt )Pt 1- 8 Kt-l X
(7)
where Jt is obtained from equation (4c) as:
(8)
Equation (7) contains C
t
and Ct*, each of which is an infinite sum with a particular structure. If
we take the quasi-difference of equation (7) employing,
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(9)
an estimable reduced form investment equation can be obtained (see GS (1991)). To take the
quasi-difference of equation (7), first lead it by one period, multiply by 'lit' then subtract from
equation (7). Hence, assuming the price elasticity of demand is constant through time in each of
the output markets, the quasi-difference equation for the dynamic investment equation takes the
following form:
(10)
where D stands for the quasi-forward-difference operator such that for any given function f{t),
D(f{t)) = f{t) - 1fItf{t + 1) and Qt is:
Qt ={(Vt - ~)(~ +Pt) - (1- Ut)} P: .(1- c5)Pt Kt- l (1- 'ft)Pt (11)
Qt captures the tax-adjusted ratio between the market value of capital and its replacement
cost. In equation (l0), output sold in domestic and foreign markets per unit of capital appear
because of the assumption of monopolistic competition. The last term captures the marginal cost of
adjusting the labor force multiplied by the labor-capital ratio.
6S
Equation (10), in fact, gives us the optimal investment decision rule for a firm which
competes and serves two separate markets, a foreign market and a domestic market, in terms of
observable variables. This decision rule holds for each time period. At this point, to find the
functional form of investment, one needs to invert G[ which completely determines the investment
function. In general, the resulting functional form will be highly nonlinear. However, using the
quadratic adjustment cost function introduced by Summers (1981) and modifying it to incorporate
the adjustment cost for employment,
G =a (!L._ b)2K+~(Xt _d)2Lt 2 K t 2 L t'
t t
(12)
where a, b, c, d are positive constants, it is possible to obtain a linear investment equation. Thus,
employing the modified adjustment cost function and rearranging equation (10), an estimable
investment equation can be obtained:
E{D(!L.) -b(1- \}I ) - D( e Q ) + St ( atYt ) +
t Kt t a(e - St) t a(e - St) (1- 8)Kt_1
.S; • (l-at)Yt )+~D[~(Lt-l Xt )_ dC(~)]}=o.
a(e - St) (1- 8)Kt_1 1- 8 a Kt-1 Lt a Kt-1
(13)
Equation (13) gives the investment decision rule for a firm OPerating and competing in
domestic and foreign output markets. Its parameters are identified, so that different hypotheses can
be tested. The difference between equation (13) and that which GS (1991) estimated (equation
(13), p. 386) is that equation (13) incorporates the assumption that the domestic firm serves
separate markets and that there is a foreign rival in both markets. Therefore, unlike the GS model,
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the effect of output on the investment decision rule of the firm is split into two parts: the first one
is the effect of output sold in the domestic market and the second one is the effect of output sold in
the foreign market, each weighted by the perceived price elasticity of demand (St / £t) in the
corresponding market. It is only under the case at =1 and St =1 (the firm operates only in its
domestic market and there is no rival) that equation (13) will be equivalent to the GS model.
III. Econometric Specification and Empirical Results
Part A: Model Specification and Estimation
Thus far we have developed a model that represents the investment decision rule of a firm
assuming duopoly in domestic and foreign output markets. Having integrated the assumption that
firms sell their goods in separate output markets in which they compete with rival firms, our
model might help one to better understand the investment decision rule of a firm. Over the last two
decades frrms have become more involved in two-way trade and are more likely to face foreign
rivals in both domestic and foreign output markets. Figure 1 gives the domestic market share (St)
of the U.S. firms and the percentage of domestic output consumed in the U.S. (at) over 1947 to
1988. During the early 1950s, the U.S. output market is almost totally served by the U.s. firms
(St =98%). The domestic market share of the U.s. firms starts to fall after 1975; by 1986 the
domestic market share is 64%. In other words, foreign firms have captured 36% of the market by
1986. When we observe the percentage of domestic output consumed in the U.s. (a,) in the early
1950s, it is seen that almost all U.S. manufactured goods are consumed domestically, around 90%
of total product. By the 1980s the percentage of domestic output consumed in the U.S. drops to
75%; that is, 250/0 of the domestic product is sold abroad. Therefore, our model incorporating
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these observations could better reflect the investment decision of a representative manufacturing
firm.
In order to test if the models explain these empirical regularities, we will use the annual
U.S. manufacturing sector data employed by GS (1991). Our goal is to estimate the adjustment
cost parameters and the price elasticity of demand in equation (13).40 Note that equation (13)
embodies the expected values of future variables. Previous researchers have used the assumption
of rational expectations to implement the method of instrumental variables by replacing the
expected values by their realizations and introducing a forecast error term (see McCallum (1976».
This study employs the generalized method of moments technique (GMM) which can be thought of
as a generalized instrumental variables technique. The only requirement for GMM is that the
instruments be predetermined. This technique allows the error terms to be conditionally
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated and one can conduct statistical inference without explicitly
characterizing the dependence of the conditional variance on the information set. Additionally, the
parameter values are consistent and the asymptotic covariance matrix can be consistently estimated
(see Hansen (1982) and Hansen and Singleton (1982».41
Recall that the assumption of duopoly in the output markets brings the foreign market share
of the domestic firm into the equation. Due to data limitations, we follow two routes. First, we
assume that the foreign output market is perfectly competitive and drop the term involving foreign
40Under the assumption that all firms are identical and each has a foreign rival firm,
it is appropriate to estimate equation (13). Thus, one can interpret the estimated
parameters as the averages for the whole sector.
41Also see Hamilton (1993), Davidson and McKinnon (1993) for a detailed discussion.
For other applications see Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988), and Epstein
and Zin (1991).
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market share of the U.S. manufacturing sector. Thus, the model is initially estimated restricting
the foreign price elasticity of demand to infinity. Second, we relax the restriction that foreign
output market is perfectly competitive and estimate the model using a proxy for the foreign market
share of U.S. firms. Nevertheless, our model is highly nonlinear in parameters. Hence, equation
(13) is normalized to yield ( atYt St) on the left hand side. Such a normalization provides us(1- 8)K
t
_ 1
with a form which is relatively easier to estimate than equation (13).42 Estimation is carried out
using GMM technique using U.S. manufacturing data for the period 1947-1987. The depreciation
rate for capital is set to a value of 0.0965 (as in OS) and the average quit rate is calculated as
0.213. A dummy variable for the years 1973-1974 is also introduced, since the value of firms in
the manufacturing sector may be mismeasured for this period (see Holland and Myers (1984)).
To employ GMM estimation, consistent but inefficient estimates are obtained using
nonlinear instrumental variables. These estimates are then used as starting values for the
parameters in the OMM estimation. In order to take into account the fact that the adjustment cost
function might be affected by an additive stochastic term, which in tum implies a moving average
structure of order one for the composite disturbance term, instruments dated (t-1) or earlier are
used. Our instrument set is a subset of that employed by OS (1991). The GMM results for the
restricted model are reported in column 2 of Table 1. The parameter estimates are reasonable in
magnitude, robust to the choice of the instrument set and their sign structure is as the model
implies.43 All parameters are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level except
for parameter band d (d is significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level). The
42Note that noralization of GS (1991) model is different from the one we employ here.
43The estimates of the structural parameters converged to the values reported i n
Table 1 when other initial values are used (for example the values reported in G5
(1991), pp. 389, Table (2) column (1)).
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price elasticity of demand is significantly greater than one and the coefficient of dummy variable for
1973-1974, v, is significantly different from zero. Observe that the estimated Q(18) statistics,
which is distributed Chi2, provides evidence that we can not reject the hypothesis that the residuals
are white noise. The HansenlSargan test statistics for overidentifying restrictions is 4.067
(distributed Chi2 with 4 degrees of freedom) which suggests that we can not reject the
overidentifying restrictions, thus the orthogonality assumptions of the model are satisfied. Hence,
one can conclude that the data support the restricted investment model developed in section II for a
firm which competes in the domestic and foreign output markets with a single foreign rival.
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Table 1: Q Model of Investment for an Open Economy with Imperfect Competition
Sample Period 1951-1985; Dependent variable: ( atYt St)
(1- 8)Kt _ 1
Estimated Parameters imposing e* =00 imposing e* =15. GS
i) Column (2) gives the GMM results imposing e*= . ii) Column (3) gives the GMM results imposing e*= 15.
iii) Column (4) gives GMM results for the GS model. iv) The instruments used in estimation
are: It-dKt- 2 ,Kt - l '"t-l ,D(Qt-l ),TBRt_1,at- 1Yt-1 S t-dO-l»)Kt- 1,At-dKt- 2Pt-l ,(1-l»)(xt-t!O-y)Lt - I )( Lt- 2 /Kt- l ) DummYt,
constant. v) Standard errors are given in parentheses. vi) Hansen/Sargan is a test for overidentifying restrictions,
distributed X2(4), and the p-value is in parentheses. * (**) denotes significantly different from zero at 5% (10%)
significance level. vii) Q(p) statistics are distributed X2(18),
Second, we relax the assumption that there is perfect competition in the foreign output
market. This brings back the omitted regressor mentioned above, therefore we can estimate the full
model. However, to construct this regressor we must measure the foreign market share (s;) of the
U.S. manufacturing sector. We construct a proxy for such share using Citibase data where s; =
exports of U.S. /(rest of the world GNP + exports of U.S. - imports to U.S.). Unfortunately, the
structural parameters for the full model could not be estimated due to numerical problems caused
by the collinearity between the fourth and the fifth terms, output sold in the domestic and the
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foreign markets, respectively, in equation (13). At the root of the problem is the foreign market
share of the U.S. firms which evolves very smoothly over time and this is what leads to
collinearity problems. However, we have reestimated the full model by imposing a value for the
foreign price elasticity of demand to 15.0 (roughly twice the value of the domestic price elasticity,
but yet not infinity). The results are reported in Table 1, column 3. Note that the estimates of the
parameters under these conditions are not significantly different from the ones obtained setting the
foreign elasticity to infinity. Also the HansenlSargan test indicates that the orthogonality
assumptions of the model are satisfied.44 In addition, restricting foreign price elasticity of demand
to different values, parameter estimates do not vary much either.
In the light of this experiment, we see that the estimated parameters are not sensitive to the
inclusion of the regressor involving the market share of the domestic firm. Thus, exclusion of the
regressor involving the foreign market share of the U.S. manufacturing sector (i.e., assuming that
the foreign output market is perfectly competitive) is legitimate, and the implications of the
existence of a duopoly in the output markets are plausible.
Part B: Model Comparison and Sensitivity Analysis
The GS model is not nested within the model developed here, that is one could not obtain
the GS model by reparametrizing equation (13). Nevertheless, one might be curious about
comparing parameter estimates of the model developed here (Table (1), column (2)) with those
presented by GS (1991, pp. 389, Table (2), column (1)). Such a comparison reveals that the
44Additionally, four other experiments are performed: the foreign market share is
set to three different sets of a constant value (0.01,0.05,0.10, respectively) and to a
trended series in the interval (0.02, 0.10). The same parameter estimates are obtained
with a change in the third digit after the decimal.
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estimate of structural parameter for capital is smaller than the corresponding GS estimate.
Although one can not reject the hypothesis that the estimate of the structural parameter for labor,
'e', is equal to the GS estimate, the adjustment cost parameter for capital, 'a', is significantly
smaller than the GS estimate at a 5% significance level. The domestic price elasticity of demand is
not significantly smaller than their estimate.
Instead of comparing the two models as above, one might want to look at the performance
of the GS model employing the GMM technique utilizing the instrument set and the normalization
criteria which are used to estimate equation (13). As mentioned before, to obtain the GS model it
is sufficient to impose St =1 and at =1. Thus, both models are treated consistently in terms of
normalization and in terms of the instruments used. Under these circumstances, the parameter
estimates of the GS model obtained employing the GMM technique are not significantly different
from zero at the 5% significance level suggesting that there might be some specification problems
with their model. (See Table (1), column (4).)
Additionally, we estimate the GS model and our model employing a longer instrument set
in order to see if the estimates are robust to the choice of instrument set.45 The parameter estimates
for our model using the longer instrument set are not different from that of estimated using the
short instrument set. Nevertheless, the GS model improves substantially when the estimation is
carried out with the longer instrument set rather than the short set (which is a subset of the long
instrument set). Additionally, the parameter estimates of the two models are not different from
each other. Moreover, both models pass the test of over identification at the 5% level, however the
marginal significance level of the model developed here is greater than that of the GS model (79%
45Results are given in the appendix.
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versus 43%). This is rather interesting also in view of the fact that the Hansen/Sargan statistic is a
multiple of the minimized objective function using the GMM. In this case it can be thought of also
as a measure of "goodness of fit. "
In the light of the comparison, when both models are treated consistently in terms of the
normalization, the data and the instrument set, one can say that there appears to be some
specification problems with the GS model; in particular parameter estimates are not robust to the
choice of instruments which might arise because of specification problems. Thus, we conclude
that the model gains explanatory power by incorporating the observations that firms compete in
their output markets and export their products. Additionally, the parameter estimates are not
sensitive to the exclusion of the term involving the foreign market share of the u.s. manufacturing
sector.
IV. Concluding Notes
This paper analyzes the implications of imperfect competition and labor adjustment costs
for Q models of investment when a firm operates in separate markets while competing with a
foreign rival when the purchasing power parity condition does not hold. A theoretical model is
developed using the framework of Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1991). The investment decision rule
of the firm obtained from this model improves upon the previous studies on two grounds: 1)
There is a duopoly regime in the output market, 2) Firms engage in selling their products in both
foreign and domestic markets while competing with another firm in both output markets.
In the second part of the paper, we estimate the model employing a generalized method of
moments technique using annual data for the u.s. manufacturing sector. The results are
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encouraging in support of the theoretical work. Particularly, the estimate of the adjustment cost
parameter for capital is smaller compared to that of previous research which in tum implies shorter
adjustment periods for capital. On the other hand, the estimate of adjustment cost for labor is large
but not significantly different from the OS estimate. Also in line with OS, we find that the U.S.
market is not perfectly competitive. Finally, sensitivity analysis shows that our model is robust to
the choice of instrument set, whereas the OS model does not appear to be.
At this point we believe that further theoretical and empirical work on models which
incorporate the existence of separate markets is necessary to have a better understanding of the
investment problem. One direction to pursue is to use a more detailed firm-level or industry-level
data to expolore the investment behaviour. This tyPe of a study might provide us with better
estimates of the structural parameters since the theory presented is developed for a representative
firm. Another direction to pursue is to estimate the model employing data from those countries
which rely on export-led growth.
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Table 2: Q Model of Investment for an Open Economy with Imperfect Competition.46
Sample Period 1951-1985; Dependent variable: ( atYt St)(1- b)Kt _ 1
Estimated Parameters imposing e* =00 GS
a 14.933 14.715
(4.716) (4.324)
b 0.142 0.181
(0.084)** (0.084)*
c 117.405 104.05
(25.08)* (28.58)*
d 1.153 1.205
(0.377)* (0.419)*
E 5.421 6.574
(1.104)* (1.240)*
v -0.434 -0.347
(0.139)* (0.163)*
HansenlSargan 5.453 9.037
(0.793) (0.434)
Q(l5) 9.863 8.158
(0.828) (0.917)
i) Column (1) gives the GMM results imposing. ii) Column (2) gives the GMM results imposing e*= 15. iii)
Column (3) gives GMM results for the GS model. iv) The instruments used in estimation
are: It-t!Kt- Z,Kt - 1'Ut-l ,D(Qt-Z ),TBRt_ Z,at-zYt-ZSt-z/O-O)Kt-Z ,At- Z/ Kt- 3Pt-Z ,0-0)( xt-Z/O-y)Lt - Z ) (Lt - 3/Kt- Z )
at - 1Yt-I St-I/(1- 8)Kt - 1 ,D(Qt-3)' 'l't-z,(1- 8)Lt _ z /(1- r)Kt- Z ' DummYt, constant. v) Standard errors are given
in parentheses. vi) Hansen/Sargan is a test for overidentifying restrictions, distributed X2(9), and the p-value is in
parentheses. * (**) denotes significantly different from zero at 5% (10%) significance level. v) Q(p) statistics are
distributed X2(15),
46 Estimation is carried out employing long instrument set.
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